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abstract
in this paper, i apply a difference-in-difference estimator to examine the impact of the merger 
between Iberia, Clickair and Vueling on route flight frequency, which is considered to be the 
main attribute of quality in the sector. Controlling for different indicators of competition and 
several route attributes, I show that the merger has implied a decrease in route flight frequency 
but the magnitude of this effect is modest. a plausible explanation of my result is a more collusive 
behavior of airlines offering flights in the routes affected by the merger.
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resumen
en este artículo se aplica un estimador de diferencias en diferencias para examinar el impacto 
de la fusión entre iberia, Clickair y Vueling en la frecuencia de vuelos a nivel de ruta, que está 
considerado como el principal atributo de calidad en el sector. Controlando por diferentes in- 
dicadores de competencia y varios atributos a nivel de ruta, muestro que la fusión ha supuesto 
una disminución de la frecuencia de la ruta de vuelo, pero la magnitud de este efecto es modesto. 
una explicación plausible de mi resultado es un comportamiento más colusivo de las compañías 
aéreas que ofrecen vuelos en las rutas afectadas por la fusión.
Palabras clave: aerolíneas, fusiones, competencia, frecuencia de vuelos, estimador de dife- 
rencias en diferencias.
Clasificación JEL: L93, D43, L4.
1. Introduction
Several	events	may	have	influenced	the	evolution	of	competition	in	the	Spanish	
airline	market	in	the	last	years.	The	increase	in	the	capacity	of	the	largest	airports,	
particularly	Madrid	and	Barcelona,	has	diluted	the	negative	effect	related	to	what	is	
considered	the	main	barrier	to	entry	in	the	sector,	the	scarcity	of	slots.	Furthermore,	
the	 increasing	 presence	 of	 leading	 low-cost	 airlines	 like	Ryanair	 or	Easyjet	 have	
spur	price	rivalry1.	Note	also	that	some	steps	have	been	done	towards	a	liberalization	
of	 traffic	between	Spain	and	non-European	Union	countries	being	 the	open	 skies	
1	 See	FAGEDA	and	FERNÁNDEZ	VILLADANGOS	(2009)	for	an	empirical	examination	of	the	effect	
of	these	two	events	on	prices	charged	by	airlines	in	a	set	of	domestic	routes.
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agreement	 between	 United	 States	 and	 the	 European	 Union	 the	 most	 clear	 and	
important	example.		
However,	 the	Spanish	airline	market	has	also	been	affected	by	a	consolidation	
process	with	likely	negative	consequences	in	terms	of	competition.	In	this	regard,	the	
former	Spanish	flag	carrier,	Iberia,	has	been	involved	in	two	recent	mergers.	Iberia	
became	the	main	shareholder	of	Vueling	after	the	merger	of	this	airline	with	its	low-
cost-subsidiary,	Clickair.	Additionally,	Iberia	recently	merged	with	British	Airways.	
Given	that	airlines	usually	operate	on	an	international	basis	given	the	nature	of	its	
activity,	decisions	about	mergers	usually	are	made	by	the	European	Commission	and	
not	by	national	competition	authorities.	
The	 merger	 between	 Iberia	 and	 British	 Airways	 has	 not	 had	 an	 impact	 on	
competition,	 at	 least	 in	 terms	 of	 traffic	 in	 non-stop	 routes,	 in	 the	 Spanish	 airline	
market2.	This	merger	was	approved	in	November	2008	by	the	European	Commission	
(case	no.	COMP/M.5747-Iberia/	British	Airways)	and	the	integration	was	done	in	
January	2011	although	both	firms	still	operate	under	different	brands.	Note	that	both	
airlines	were	already	operating	like	a	single	airline	in	terms	of	their	route	choices	
before	the	merger	as	they	were	closely	integrated	within	the	Oneworld	alliance.	In	
fact,	both	airlines	were	just	offering	services	simultaneously	before	the	merger	in	the	
routes	that	link	Madrid	and	Barcelona	with	London-Heathrow.	
A	descriptive	analysis	for	these	two	routes	reveals	the	following	facts	using	flight	
frequency	data	of	RDC	aviation.	In	the	comparison	of	the	supply	in	a	period	before	
the	merger	was	completed	(years	2008	and	2009)	and	after	 the	merger	(2012	and	
2013),	 I	may	check	a	decrease	 in	frequencies	 in	 the	route	Madrid-London	of	 just	
3	per	cent	and	a	strong	stability	in	the	share	of	the	two	airlines	offering	services	there;	
60	per	cent	of	total	flights	are	operated	by	Iberia	and	40	per	cent	by	British	Airways	in	
both	periods.	In	the	route	Barcelona-London,	the	decrease	in	total	route	frequencies	
between	the	two	periods	is	about	23	per	cent.	In	the	period	before	the	merger,	the	
share	of	Iberia	was	about	40	per	cent	while	the	share	of	British	Airways	was	about	
0	per	cent.	In	the	period	after	the	merger,	British	Airways	is	the	only	airline	that	
offers	services	in	this	route	and	it	has	increased	frequencies	to	partially	compensate	
the	withdrawal	of	Iberia.	The	withdrawal	of	Iberia	on	the	route	Barcelona-London	
must	be	understood	within	the	more	general	strategy	of	Iberia	of	concentrate	all	its	
flights	in	its	hub,	Madrid.	From	Barcelona	airport,	Iberia	currently	only	offers	flights	
to	the	route	that	link	with	Madrid.	Thus,	the	influence	of	the	merger	in	the	supply	of	
flights	in	the	route	Barcelona-London	is	not	relevant,	as	it	is	not	the	case	in	the	route	
Madrid-London.
The	impact	of	the	merger	between	Iberia,	Clickair	and	Vueling	deserves	much	
more	attention	in	terms	of	the	analysis	of	their	effects	on	the	supply	of	flights	in	non-
stop	routes	departing	from	Spanish	airports.	Indeed,	a	high	number	of	routes	were	
2	 The	impact	on	connectging	traffic	may	have	been	stronger	but	the	analysis	of	competition	in	routes	with	
different	stops	would	require	working	with	demand	data	for	the	true	origin	and	destination	of	passengers.	
Unfortunately,	I	do	not	have	such	data	to	undertake	this	analysis.
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simultaneously	operated	by	Iberia	and	Vueling,	or	Clickair	and	Vueling	before	the	
merger	was	approved.	Furthermore,	price	rivalry	between	Clickair	and	Vueling	was	
intense	in	such	a	period	(Fageda	et al.,	2012).	It	may	also	be	expected	that	frequency	
competition	was	also	strong	in	the	years	previous	to	the	merger.		
Mergers	 may	 have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 the	 welfare	 of	 passengers	 in	 two	
different	but	interrelated	dimensions;	prices	and	flight	frequency.	Flight	frequency	is	
considered	the	main	attribute	of	quality	in	the	airline	market	because	it	determines	
the	schedule	delay	cost	which	is	the	difference	between	the	actual	and	desired	time	
of	 departure	 (Bilotkach	 et al.,	 2010).	 Note	 also	 that	 flight	 frequency	 is	 a	 strong	
determinant	of	prices	as	it	has	an	influence	on	the	fixed	costs	of	airlines	and	load	
factors	of	the	planes.	
In	this	paper,	I	examine	the	impact	on	flight	frequencies	of	the	merger	between	
Iberia,	 Clickair	 and	 Vueling.	 I	 run	 several	 regressions	 controlling	 for	 different	
indicators	of	competition	taking	advantage	of	a	rich	dataset	 that	 include	domestic	
and	international	routes.	The	econometric	evaluation	of	the	merger	is	done	through	
the	difference-in-difference	method	which	is	a	method	widely	used	in	the	analysis	of	
mergers.	Results	of	my	analysis	may	be	useful	to	assess	the	effects	of	such	merger	
for	passengers	and	hence	they	may	help	motivate	future	decisions	of	the	competition	
authorities	on	mergers	in	the	Spanish	air	transport	market.	
Here,	it	is	important	to	remark	that	several	studies	have	examined	the	impact	of	
mergers	on	prices	(i.e.	Kim	and	Singal,	1993;	Morrison,	199;	Peters,	200;	Zhang	
and	Round,	2009;	Dobson	and	Piga,	2013)	but	 there	 is	scarce	evidence	about	 the	
impact	of	mergers	on	frequencies.	Only	the	works	of	Bilotkach	(2011),	Borenstein	
(1990),	 Fageda	 and	Perdiguero	 (2014),	Richard	 (2003)	 and	Werden	et al.	 (1991)	
have	provided	empirical	analysis	of	the	mergers	on	frequencies.
The	 remaining	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 In	 the	 second	 section,	 I	
provide	some	details	and	related	references	of	the	merger	examined.	Then,	I	specify	
the	 empirical	 model	 and	 state	 my	 expectations	 for	 each	 explanatory	 variable.	
The	 following	section	 reports	 the	 regression	 results.	The	 last	 section	contains	 the	
concluding	remarks.
2. The merger between Iberia, Clickair and Vueling
In	200	Iberia	initiated	a	new	business	plan	that	led	to	the	concentration	of	its	
operations	at	its	main	hub,	the	airport	of	Madrid-Barajas.	A	further	measure	in	this	
plan	was	to	create	a	new	low-cost	airline,	Clickair,	with	an	operating	base	located	
in	 the	airport	of	Barcelona-El	Prat.	 Iberia	had	a	20	per	cent	stake	 in	Clickair	and	
controlled	 80	 per	 cent	 of	 its	 economic	 rights.	Using	 Iberia’s	 slots	 and	 resources,	
Clickair	soon	acquired	the	largest	market	share	at	Barcelona	airport.	Note	that	Iberia	
did	not	have	formally	a	majority	holding	in	the	capital	of	Clickair	so	that	it	is	doubtful	
whether	the	transfer	of	slots	was	lawful.	
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One	of	the	most	probable	motives	for	the	creation	of	Clickair	was	to	compete	with	
another	Spanish	low-cost	airline,	Vueling,	which	had	become	a	serious	competitor	to	
Iberia	in	the	Spanish	domestic	market.	Indeed,	Fageda	et al. (2012)	shows	that	while	
operating	as	Iberia,	the	former	Spanish	flag	carrier	was	restricted	in	its	attempts	to	
charge	lower	prices	than	those	of	its	rivals.	As	Clickair,	however,	Iberia	was	able	to	
charge	very	low	prices.	Data	in	this	study	show	that	the	head-to-head	competition	
between	Clickair	and	Vueling	led	to	a	substantial	reduction	in	prices	on	the	routes	
in	which	both	companies	operated.	In	fact,	the	financial	situation	of	the	latter	airline	
seriously	deteriorated	in	this	period	to	the	point	that	was	near	bankruptcy	in	2008.
In	July	2008,	Iberia,	Clickair	and	Vueling	agreed	a	two-step	merger	deal:	first,	
Clickair	was	taken	over	by	Vueling	(with	Clickair	ceasing	to	operate)	and,	second,	
Iberia	became	the	leading	shareholder	in	the	new	firm	(now	called	Vueling).	Iberia	
thus	obtained	45.8	per	cent	of	the	shares,	while	the	second	largest	shareholder	was	
Nefinsa	with	4.15	per	cent	of	 the	 shares.	Nefinsa	 is	 the	owner	of	Air	Nostrum,	a	
regional	airline	that	has	a	franchisee	contract	with	Iberia.	The	remaining	50	per	cent	
of	the	capital	was	owned	by	shareholders	(investment	funds	and	individual	investors)	
with	holdings	well	below	1	per	cent3.	Thus,	Iberia	effectively	controls	the	board	of	
directors	of	the	new	Vueling.	In	January	2009,	the	European	Commission	agreed	to	
the	merger	between	Iberia,	Clickair	and	Vueling	on	the	condition	that	certain	slots	
on	given	routes	were	transferred	to	other	airlines	(case	no.	COMP/M-534-Iberia/
Vueling/Clickair).	The	merger	was	completed	in	July	2009.	
Iberia	does	not	had	a	majority	holding	in	the	capital	of	Vueling	just	after	the	merger,	
since	 it	held	 less	 than	50	per	cent	of	 shares.	However,	 the	 integration	of	 the	 two	
companies’	respective	operations	was	quite	clear	(recall	that	all	other	investors	were	
minority	shareholders	 in	Vueling’s	capital).	Since	 the	merger	was	made	effective,	
most	of	Vueling’s	flights	are	offered	under	code-share	agreements	with	Iberia;	yet,	
they	do	not	operate	simultaneously	on	any	route	except	Madrid-Barcelona	(which	
is	one	of	the	densest	routes	in	the	world).	Furthermore,	since	the	merger	came	into	
effect,	they	have	shared	the	same	frequent	flyer	program.	
Fageda	et al.	(2012)	show	that	the	new	subsidiary	of	Iberia	was	able	to	increase	
prices	 substantially	 after	 the	merger	was	complete.	Thus,	 the	war	prices	between	
Clickair	and	Vueling	was	followed	by	a	substantial	increase	of	prices	once	Vueling	
was	 integrated	 in	 Iberia’s	 group.	 It	 is	 not	 unreasonable	 to	 state	 that	 Iberia	 was	
following	 a	 predatory	 behaviour	 to	 force	 the	 exit	 of	 a	 serious	 rival.	 Given	 that	
predatory	behaviour	is	considered	to	be	an	anti-competitive	practice,	it	would	appear	
that	a	merger	appraisal	should	also	include	the	evaluation	of	predatory	practices	by	
the	firm	acquiring	its	rival.	
Fageda	and	Perdiguero	(2014)	provide	an	empirical	examination	of	the	merger	
between	 Iberia,	Clickair	 and	Vueling	 that	 is	 closely	 related	with	 this	 study.	They	
examine	 the	 impact	on	prices	and	frequencies	of	 this	merger.	They	find	a	modest	
3	 Recently,	 IAG	 (which	 it	 is	 the	 financial	 holding	 controlling	 Iberia	 and	 British	Airways)	 took	 the	
remaining	capital	of	Vueling.
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effect	 on	 prices	 and	 frequencies	when	 considering	 the	 affected	 routes	 in	 general	
terms.	However,	their	results	show	that	the	impact	on	prices	is	high	when	the	routes	
affected	are	those	where	Iberia	and	Vueling	were	simultaneously	operating	before	
the	merger	and	the	impact	on	frequencies	is	high	when	the	routes	affected	are	those	
where	Iberia	and	Clickair	were	simultaneously	operating	before	 the	merger.	They	
argue	that	 the	behavior	of	 the	airlines	following	the	merger	may	be	related	to	 the	
different	passenger	types	who	are	the	predominant	users	of	the	routes	affected	by	the	
merger.	It	would	appear	that	the	proportion	of	leisure	travelers	(price	sensitive	and	
less	time	sensitive)	is	higher	on	routes	where	the	two	low-cost	airlines	previously	
operated.	By	contrast,	 the	proportion	of	business	passengers	 (more	 time	sensitive	
and	less	price	sensitive	than	leisure	passengers)	appears	to	be	higher	on	routes	on	
which	the	network	carrier	and	one	of	the	low-cost	carriers	previously	operated.
This	paper	conducts	a	similar	analysis	to	that	of	Fageda	and	Perdiguero	(2014)	
but	it	takes	advantage	of	a	richer	dataset.	Hence,	I	can	provide	a	more	rigorous	test	of	
the	impact	of	the	considered	merger	on	flight	frequencies.	The	study	of	Fageda	and	
Perdiguero	(2014)	was	based	on	73	domestic	routes	and	data	of	flight	frequencies	
were	taken	for	a	sample	week.	The	period	analyzed	was	from	the	summer	of	2001	
to	 the	 summer	of	2011,	considering	 the	 summer	of	2009	 the	period	 in	which	 the	
merger	was	 binding.	Routes	 affected	 by	 the	merger	were	 considered	 to	 be	 those	
where	Vueling	was	competing	with	Clickair	or	Iberia	in	at	least	one	season	(either	
summer	or	winter)	of	the	previous	years	to	the	merger.	Note	also	that	the	levels	of	
competition	were	just	approximated	by	the	concentration	index.	
The	 empirical	 analysis	 in	 this	 study	 uses	 189	 routes	 including	 domestic	 and	
international	routes.	Hence,	I	can	analyze	whether	the	impact	of	the	merger	has	been	
stronger	in	domestic	or	international	routes	and	I	can	control	for	new	variables	like	
competition	 from	 secondary	 airports	 (which	 mainly	 affects	 international	 routes).	
Note	also	that	information	for	flight	frequencies	refer	to	all	year	and	not	just	a	sample	
week.	
Additionally,	I	make	a	stricter	separation	between	the	periods	before	and	after	the	
merger.	To	guarantee	the	symmetry	between	the	two	periods,	I	consider	data	for	two	
years	before	the	merger	was	approved	(years	200	and	2007)	and	two	years	after	the	
merger	was	completed	(years	2010	and	2011).	Hence,	I	drop	from	the	analysis	two	
years	(years	2008	and	2009)	in	which	the	airlines	involved	in	the	merger	were	likely	
not	competing	intensively.	Alternatively,	it	could	be	also	interesting	to	examine	the	
behavior	of	the	airlines	when	they	were	aware	of	the	merger	but	still	was	not	made	
effective.	However,	my	focus	here	 is	on	 the	 impact	of	 the	mergers	on	passengers	
(in	 terms	of	flight	 frequency)	 and	not	 on	 the	behavior	 of	 the	 airlines	 in	 different	
scenarios.	
I	also	make	a	stricter	separation	between	the	routes	affected	or	not	affected	by	
the	merger.	 I	 consider	 that	 the	 routes	 affected	 by	 the	merger	 are	 those	 routes	 in	
which	Vueling	was	competing	with	Clickair	or	 Iberia	both	 in	200	and	2007	and	
the	 routes	 not	 affected	 by	 the	merger	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 those	 where	Vueling	
was	not	competing	with	any	of	 the	other	airlines	neither	 in	200	nor	2007.	So,	 I	
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drop	 those	 routes	where	Vueling	was	competing	with	any	of	 the	other	airlines	 in	
2006	or	2007	because	these	routes	cannot	be	strictly	classified	as	routes	affected	by	
(or	not)	competition	between	the	airlines	involved	later	in	the	merger.	Concerning	
the	routes	affected	by	 the	merger,	 I	can	examine	 the	 impact	of	 the	merger	 in	 two	
clearly	different	scenarios:	1)	In	 the	period	previous	 to	 the	negotiation	of	merger,	
competition	between	the	airlines	involved	in	the	operation	was	intense	in	the	routes	
in	which	they	were	offering	simultaneously	services,	2)	in	the	period	after	the	merger	
was	 complete,	 only	 one	 of	 the	 airlines	 involved	 in	 the	merger	 (either	Vueling	or	
Iberia)	was	offering	services	in	the	same	set	of	routes4.
Note	also	that	I	add	other	variables	that	may	approximate	the	levels	of	competition	
in	the	route	like	the	share	of	low-cost	airlines	or	the	share	of	the	merged	airlines	in	the	
route.	The	main	limitation	of	this	study	in	relation	to	that	of	Fageda	and	Perdiguero	
(2014)	is	I	do	not	have	available	information	for	prices.	
Overall,	 I	have	been	able	 to	collect	complete	data	for	189	routes	for	 the	years	
200,	2007,	2010	and	2011	so	that	my	sample	contains	75	observations.	The	routes	
considered	have	Barcelona,	 Ibiza,	Madrid	or	Sevilla	 as	 origin	 airports.	The	main	
operating	base	of	both	Clickair	 and	Vueling	was	Barcelona	but	Vueling	also	had	
a	 relevant	presence	 in	Madrid,	 Ibiza	and	Sevilla.	The	destination	airports	are	any	
airport	 located	 in	 the	 European	 Union.	 In	 this	 regard,	 I	 exclude	 intercontinental	
flights	 because	 neither	Clickair	 nor	Vueling	 offered	 flights	 to	 non-European	 des-	
tinations	in	the	period	previous	to	the	merger.	Among	the	189	routes,	33	are	affected	
by	the	merger	(15	depart	from	Barcelona,	14	from	Madrid,	2	from	Ibiza	and	2	from	
Sevilla;	19	link	domestic	destinations	and	14	international	destinations).
3. The empirical model
In	this	section,	I	implement	a	multivariate	analysis	to	identify	the	impact	of	the	
considered	merger	on	routes	flight	frequencies.	I	use	similar	control	variables	to	those	
employed	in	other	empirical	studies	that	estimate	the	determinants	of	frequencies	on	
air	routes	(see,	for	example,	Schipper	et al.,	2002;	Richard,	2003;	Pai,	2010;	Calzada	
and	Fageda,	2012;	Bilotkach et al.,	2010,	2013;	Brueckner	and	Luo,	2013;	Zou	and	
Hansen,	2014).	The	equation	to	estimate	for	route	k	at	time	t	(Frequency)	takes	the	
following	form:	
Frequencykt	=	β0	+	β1Distancek	+	β2Populationkt	+	β3Income_per_capitakt	+
+	β4Dsecondarykt	+	β5Dtourismk	+	βDinternationalk	+	β7DBCNk	+	β8DIBZk	+	β9DSVQk	+
+	β10Dmerger_yeart	+	β11Dmerger_routesk	+	β12Diff-in-Diffkt	+	β13Competitionkt	+	ekt	 [1]
4	 The	 exception	 is	 the	 route	Madrid-Barcelona	 where	 both	Vueling	 and	 Iberia	 are	 offering	 services	
although	most	of	flights	of	Iberia	are	operated	as	a	shuttle	air	service.
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In	 this	 equation,	 the	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 total	 number	 of	 annual	 flights	
offered	by	airlines	on	route	k	in	year	t.	As	explanatory	variables,	I	include	variables	
that	measure	 the	 population	 and	 per	 capita	 income	 of	 the	 destination	 in	 order	 to	
control	for	demand.	I	expect	airlines	to	offer	higher	frequencies	on	routes	that	link	
richer	and	more	populous	cities.	I	also	take	into	account	the	influence	of	the	route’s	
distance,	calculated	as	the	number	of	kilometers	flown	to	link	the	route’s	endpoints.	
Airlines	may	prefer	to	use	smaller	planes	at	higher	frequencies	on	short-haul	routes.	
Thus,	I	would	expect	a	negative	relationship	between	distance	and	frequency
I	also	consider	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	a	value	of	one	for	routes	and	periods	in	
which	air	services	are	offered	simultaneously	from	two	origin	airports	(i.e., Barcelona	
and	Girona,	Barcelona	and	Reus)	to	the	same	destination.	For	example,	Ryanair	may	
be	offering	flights	to	Amsterdam	from	Girona	and	airlines	like	Vueling	or	Transavia	
may	be	also	offering	flights	to	the	same	destination	from	Barcelona.	Demand	in	those	
routes	could	be	higher	than	predicted	by	the	other	explanatory	variables	of	my	model	
so	the	coefficient	associated	to	this	variable	is	expected	to	be	positive.	Indeed,	city-pair	
markets	that	are	covered	by	multiple	airports	are	usually	dense	markets.	
I	also	include	a	dummy	variable	that	distinguish	between	domestic	and	international	
routes	 and	 another	 that	 identify	 tourist	 routes.	 By	 tourist	 routes,	 I	 mean	 routes	
that	 have	 a	 destination	 airport	 located	 in	Balearic	 islands,	Canary	 islands,	 Sicily,	
Sardinia,	Corsica,	Malaga	and	Alicante	as	it	has	been	considered	in	other	previous	
studies	(Fageda	and	Flores-Fillol,	2012a,	2012b).	I	may	expect	that	frequencies	are	
higher	in	domestic	routes	due	to	higher	demand,	while	frequencies	should	be	lower	
in	tourist	routes	as	the	proportion	of	leisure	passengers	may	be	higher	in	these	routes.	
Furthermore,	 I	 include	 dummy	 variables	 for	 the	 different	 origin	 airports	 taking	
Madrid	as	the	reference	case.	Given	that	Madrid	is	a	hub	a	network	airline,	I	expect	a	
negative	sign	in	the	coefficient	associate	to	these	dummy	variables	due	to	the	higher	
demand	derived	from	connecting	traffic	in	Madrid	airport.	
To	analyze	the	effect	that	the	merger	has	had	on	frequencies,	I	use	a	difference-
in-difference	estimator.	The	variable	Dmerger_year	 is	a	dummy	variable	 that	 takes	 the	
value	1	for	all	routes	in	the	periods	after	the	merger	and	0	otherwise.	This	variable	
reflects	the	change	in	frequencies	before	and	after	the	merger	on	all	the	routes.	The	
variable	Dmerger_routes	is	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	the	value	1	for	all	periods	of	time	
only	on	those	specific	routes	affected	by	the	merger	and	0	otherwise.	I	understand	
routes	affected	by	the	merger	as	being	those	on	which	Vueling	was	offering	services	
simultaneously	with	Clickair	 or	 Iberia	 in	 the	 years	 previous	 to	 the	merger	 (200	
and	2007).	This	variable	reflects	the	frequencies	offered	on	those	routes	affected	by	
the	merger	in	relation	to	those	that	remain	unaffected.	The	variable	Diff-in-Diff is	
constructed	 through	 the	 interaction	between	Dmerger_year	 and	Dmerger_routes.	Hence,	 this	
variable	is	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	the	value	1	only	in	the	periods	after	the	merger	
and	only	for	those	routes	affected	by	the	merger,	and	0	otherwise.	The	coefficient	
accompanying	this	variable	is	the	difference-in-difference	estimator.	If	the	coefficient	
is	negative	and	significant	then	the	merger	led	to	a	reduction	in	frequencies,	while	if	
the	coefficient	is	positive	and	significant	then	it	led	to	an	increase	in	frequencies.	
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I	include	different	variables	that	seek	to	capture	competition	at	the	route	level5.	
In	a	first	set	of	regressions	I	consider	the	route	concentration,	measured	using	the	
Herfindahl-Hirschman	index,	in	terms	of	flight	frequencies.	The	expected	sign	of	the	
coefficient	associated	with	route	concentration	is	negative	given	that	airlines	compete	
in	frequencies.	In	a	second	set	of	regressions,	I	consider	the	route	share	of	the	airlines	
involved	in	the	merger	and	the	share	of	low-cost	airlines	on	the	route.	Shares	for	both	
variables	are	calculated	in	terms	of	frequencies.	The	expected	sign	of	the	coefficient	
associated	with	the	share	of	the	airlines	involved	in	the	merger	is	negative	because	a	
higher	share	of	these	airlines	may	imply	softer	route	competition.
The	expected	sign	of	the	variable	for	the	share	of	low-cost	competitors	is	not	clear	
a	priori.	On	the	one	hand,	a	higher	share	of	 low-cost	airlines	may	imply	stronger	
competition	on	the	route	but,	on	the	other	hand,	low-cost	airlines	may	offer	lower	
frequencies	than	network	airlines	as	they	may	be	more	interested	in	capturing	leisure	
passengers.	In	this	regard,	Goolsbee	and	Syverson	(2008)	examine	the	responses	of	
incumbent	US	airlines	to	the	threat	of	entry	of	Southwest	using	a	sample	of	US	routes.	
They	find	that	incumbents	reduce	prices	when	Southwest	threatens	a	route	but	these	
fare	cuts	are	not	accompanied	by	an	increase	in	frequencies	or	seats.	Another	study	
that	examines	the	impact	of	low-cost	carriers	on	frequencies	is	that	of	Bettini	and	
Oliveira	(2008).	They	analyze	the	determinants	of	major	carrier’s	capacity	in	routes	
connecting	 the	30	biggest	Brazilian	airports,	 including	as	 explanatory	variables	a	
dummy	for	those	routes	in	which	Gol	is	offering	flights.	They	found	positive	effects	
of	low-cost	entry	on	major	carrier’s	capacity.	
Airline	 frequency	 data	 at	 the	 route	 level	 have	 been	 obtained	 from	RDC	 aviation	
(Capstats	statistics),	while	route	distance	data	are	taken	from	the	Official	Airline	Guide	
(OAG).	Population	and	income	per	capita	data	refer	to	the	NUTS	3	regions	(“provincias”)	
and	 have	 been	 provided	 by	 Cambridge	 Econometrics	 (European	 Regional	 Database	
publication).	Note	I	use	an	explanatory	variable	that	consider	the	share	of	low-cost	airlines	
in	the	route.	Table	1	provides	a	list	of	low-cost	airlines	that	offer	services	in	routes	of	our	
sample	in	at	least	one	of	the	years	of	the	considered	period.	
5	 It	could	be	argued	that	concentration	variables	may	be	simultaneously	determined	with	the	number	of	
total	flights	offered	in	the	route.	Any	possible	endogeneity	bias	could	affect	the	magnitude	and	sign	of	the	
coefficients	for	these	variables	but	is	should	not	affect	the	difference-in-difference	estimator.	This	being	said,	
the	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	examine	the	impact	of	the	merger	controlling	for	the	intensity	of	competition	and	
not	to	examine	the	impact	of	competition	on	frequencies.	Note	that	it	is	hard	to	find	good	instruments	for	
the	concentration	variable	as	 the	lags	of	 these	variables	are	strongly	correlated	with	the	contemporaneous	
variable.
TABLE 1
LIST OF LOw-COST AIRLInES OFFERInG AIR SERVICES In ROuTES 
OF OuR SAMPLE
Air	One,	Air	Berlin,	Alpi	Eagles,	Condor,	easyjet,	Germanwings,	Hapagfly,	LTU,	Monarch,	MyAir,	
MyTravelLite,	NIKI,	Norwegian,	Ryanair,	SkyEurope,	Smart	Wings,	Sterling,	Thomson,	Transavia,	
Virgin	Express,	Volare,	Wind	Jet,	Wizzair	
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4 Estimation and results
I	perform	the	estimation	using	three	different	techniques	as	a	robustness	check;	
the	ordinary	least	squares	(OLS),	the	route	random	effects	and	the	route	fixed	effects.	
The	ordinary	least	squares	do	not	allow	considering	unobserved	route	heterogeneity	
but	it	is	not	conditioned	by	some	inconsistency	problems	that	may	affect	the	other	
estimators.	
The	 use	 of	 random	 or	 fixed	 effects	 allows	 us	 to	 consider	 unobserved	 route	
heterogeneity.	An	advantage	of	the	fixed	effects	model	is	that	it	allows	us	to	control	
for	any	omitted	variables	that	correlate	with	the	variables	of	interest	and	which	do	not	
change	over	time.	A	shortcoming	of	the	fixed	effects	model	is	that	the	effect	of	time-
invariant	variables	 cannot	be	 identified.	Note	 also	 that	 the	fixed	effects	 estimator	
may	not	be	consistent	when	the	number	of	time	periods	is	small	as	it	is	my	case	here.	
The	random	effects	model	has	the	advantage	that	it	may	capture	both	the	between	
and	the	within	variation	of	the	data	but	a	disadvantage	of	the	random	effects	model	is	
related	with	the	potential	bias	derived	from	the	correlation	between	the	explanatory	
variables	and	the	random	effects.	
Table	 2	 shows	 the	 descriptive	 statistics	 of	 the	 variables	 used	 in	 the	 empirical	
analysis,	while	Table	3	shows	the	correlation	matrix.	All	the	variables	show	sufficient	
variability	to	provide	robust	estimations	and	none	of	the	explanatory	variables	is	so	
correlated	to	create	a	multicollinearity	problem.
Table	 4	 shows	 the	 test	 for	 mean	 differences	 for	 the	 most	 relevant	 variables	
in	 our	 analysis	 in	 the	 period	 before	 and	 after	 the	 merger;	 flight	 frequency	 and	
competition	variables.	Regarding	the	routes	affected	by	the	merger,	the	descriptive	
statistics	 suggest	 a	modest	 increase	 in	 concentration	while	 the	 share	 of	 low-cost	
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES uSED 
In THE EMPIRICAL AnALySIS
Mean Standard deviation
Frequencies 1485.37 2097.22
Distance 110.58 582.9
Population 1889.80 233.5
Income	per	capita 28.51 14.28
Dsecondary 0.13 0.34
Dtourism 0.18 0.38
Dinternational 0.5 0.47
HHI 0. 0.2
Share_lowcost 0.2 0.37
Share_merged_airline 0.40 0.37
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airlines	has	increased	and	the	share	of	the	airlines	involved	in	the	merger	has	been	
reduced.	Therefore,	data	do	not	show	a	clear	worsening	of	the	competition	on	the	
routes	affected	by	the	merger.	However,	the	decrease	in	frequencies	is	substantial.	
Concerning	the	routes	not	affected	by	the	merger,	there	is	a	high	stability	in	the	mean	
values	for	all	the	considered	variables.	The	only	exception	has	to	do	with	the	share	of	
low-cost	airlines	that	has	significantly	increased	in	the	period	after	the	merger.	
Another	interesting	fact	from	Table	4	is	the	strong	differences	in	the	mean	values	
for	the	two	periods	regarding	routes	affected	and	not	affected	by	the	merger.	In	this	
regard,	routes	affected	by	the	merger	are	denser	because	mean	frequencies	are	higher.	
Furthermore,	the	levels	of	concentration	in	these	routes	are	lower	but	the	share	of	
low-cost	airlines	is	also	lower.	
Table	5	shows	the	results	of	estimates	of	the	frequency	equation	when	using	all	
sample	and	variables.	The	overall	explanatory	power	of	the	model	is	reasonable	high	
when	the	estimation	is	made	using	ordinary	least	squares	and	random	effects,	while	
it	is	much	lower	when	using	the	fixed	effects	estimation.	Recall	that	the	fixed	effects	
model	does	not	identify	variables	that	are	time-invariant	like	distance	or	the	dummy	
for	international	routes.	In	this	regard,	the	Hausman	test	takes	a	value	of	18.31	and	
we	are	not	able	to	accept	the	null	hypothesis	that	differences	in	coefficients	are	not	
systematic.	Thus,	the	random	effects	model	is	more	informative	but	the	fixed	effects	
model	is	more	reliable.	
The	sign	of	 the	coefficients	estimated	for	 the	variables	of	distance,	population	
and	income	per	capita	have	the	expected	signs	and	are	statistically	significant	when	
using	the	ordinary	least	squares	and	random	effects	methods,	while	only	the	variable	
of	income	per	capita	works	as	expected	in	the	estimation	that	uses	fixed	effects	(the	
variable	of	distance	cannot	be	identified).
The	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 dummy	 variable	 for	 routes	 in	 which	 air	
services	are	offered	from	secondary	airports	 is	positive	 in	all	 regressions	but	 it	 is	
only	statistically	significant	in	the	regression	that	uses	ordinary	least	squares.	While	
demand	 in	 these	 routes	 may	 be	 higher	 than	 predicted	 by	 the	 other	 explanatory	
variables,	 its	 statistical	 significance	 is	 conditioned	 upon	 the	 estimation	 method	
used.	
The	 coefficient	 of	 the	 dummy	 variable	 for	 tourist	 routes	 is	 not	 significant	 in	
any	regression	so	 that	we	do	not	find	a	differential	effect	 for	 tourist	 routes	 in	 the	
frequency	choices	of	airlines.	On	the	contrary,	the	coefficient	of	the	dummy	variable	
for	 international	 routes	 is	 negative	 and	 statistically	 significant	 in	 all	 regressions.	
Hence,	it	seems	that	demand	is	higher	in	domestic	routes	even	after	controlling	for	
other	demand	shifters.	As	expected,	the	coefficients	of	the	dummy	variables	for	the	
origin	airports	are	negative	and	statistically	significant	in	the	regressions	where	they	
can	be	identified.	
Regarding	competition	variables,	the	coefficient	of	the	concentration	variable	is	
negative	and	statistically	significant	in	all	regressions	as	expected.	In	a	similar	vein,	
the	coefficient	of	the	dummy	variable	for	the	share	of	the	airlines	involved	in	the	
merger	is	also	negative	and	statistically	significant	in	all	regressions.	On	the	contrary,	
					AN	EMPIRICAL	ASSESSMENT	OF	THE	MERGER	BETWEEN	IBERIA,	CLICKAIR	AND	VUELING	 89
TA
BL
E 
5
FR
Eq
uE
nC
y 
Eq
uA
TI
On
 E
ST
IM
AT
ES
 (R
ES
uL
TS
 u
SI
nG
 A
LL
 SA
M
PL
E 
An
D 
AL
L V
 A
RI
AB
LE
S)
OL
S
Ra
nd
om
 ef
fec
ts
Fi
xe
d e
ffe
cts
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Int
erc
ep
t
37
28
.89
(24
4.2
9)*
**
35
48
.74
(40
.2
4)*
**
29
84
.28
(47
7.0
4)*
**
25
12
.98
(50
3.5
8)*
**
14
77
.43
(95
1.8
7)*
**
13
37
.8
(10
5
.01
)
Di
sta
nc
e
–0
.54
(0.
09
)**
*
–0
.
(0.
08
)**
*
–0
.2
(0.
15
)**
*
–0
.0
(0.
15
)**
*
–
–
Po
pu
lat
ion
0.1
7
(0.
02
)**
*
0.2
0
(0.
02
)**
*
0.2
0
(0.
0
)**
*
0.2
1
(0.
0
)**
*
–0
.04
(0.
52
)
–0
.21
(0.
58
)
Inc
om
e	p
er	
ca
pit
a
13
.9
(3.
20
)**
*
12
.23
(3.
75
)**
*
17
.99
(4.
54
)**
*
19
.71
(4.
9
)**
*
17
.78
(10
.90
)*
24
.3
(12
.85
)*
Ds
ec
on
da
ry
11
95
.37
(43
9.8
2)*
**
13
37
.55
(44
0.8
2)*
**
14
2.0
7
(92
.34
)
13
8.7
0
(95
.44
)
57
.45
(54
.71
)
54
.1
(0
.19
)
Dt
ou
ris
m
–1
49
.0
(22
.2
1)
–2
8.2

(24
1.8
2)
–1
5.4
8
(44
2.4
3)
79
.10
(45
0.8
0)
–
–
Di
nte
rna
tio
na
l
–1
10
7.9
7
(2
0.2
1)*
**
–1
33
2.4
2
(28
0.7
8)*
**
–1
0
1.7
4
(49
7.0
5)*
*
–1
10
9.9
1
(49
4.3
4)*
*
–
–
DB
CN
–1
35
0.4
5
(25
0.9
0)*
**
–1
54
.8
1
(27
3.4
5)*
**
–9
02
.08
(29
1.0
3)*
**
–9
10
.99
(29
7.0
7)*
**
–
–
DI
BZ
–1
57
9.5
2
(11
8.4
9)*
**
–1
4
2.
3
(14
2.4
0)*
**
–1
55
9.3
7
(2
0.3
7)*
**
–1
0
5.8
2
(2
5.5
9)*
**
–
–
DS
VQ
–1
81
2.4
8
(1
0.3
8)*
**
–1
99
.
3
(15
1.2
7)*
**
–1
19
7.7
2
(51
0.3
0)*
*
–1
23
.9

(54
9.
1)*
*
–
–
Dm
erg
er_
ye
ar
–8
3.2
0
(
.99
)
–4
2.2
9
(72
.4
)
–7
0.
1
(25
.39
)**
*
–7
0.
1
(28
.57
)**
–
0.1
8
(33
.50
)**
*
–5
1.3

(39
.21
)
Dm
erg
er_
rou
tes
17
25
.38
(37
8.3
2)*
**
21
7
.82
(3
3.2
7)*
**
20
92
.98
(5
9.0
)*
**
22
91
.09
(5
1.9
5)*
**
32
9.2
0
(43
3.
3)
3
9.5
4
(43
8.8
1)
Di
ff–
in–
Di
ff
–
48
.2
(52
0.4
2)
–8
08
.4
(52
2.4
4)
–
91
.2
(24
8.0
8)*
**
–7
28
.57
(24
7.5
4)*
**
–
54
.13
(22
9.5
3)*
**
–7
01
.53
(23
7.2
3)*
**
HH
I
–1
48
2.8
7
(14
.2
0)*
**
–
–
28
.85
(88
.91
)**
*
–
–5
95
.91
(84
.55
)**
*
–
Sh
are
_lo
wc
os
t
–
–4
17
.18
(13
2.3
)*
*
–
7.
5
(7
.50
)
–
31
.19
(77
.
)
Sh
are
_m
erg
ed
_a
irl
ine
–
–1
07
1.4
5
(21
.8
)*
**
–
–3
71
.4
(18
.4
4)*
*
–
–3
42
.23
(19
5.3
)*
N R2
Te
st	
(jo
int
	si
gn
.)
75

0.5
4
3
.82
**
*
75

0.5
3
53
.49
**
*
75

0.5
1
21
9.8
5*
**
75

0.4
9
13
5.4
4*
**
75

0.2
2
19
.03
**
*
75

0.1
9
22
.3
**
*
NO
TE
S:	
S
ta
nd
ar
d	
er
ro
rs
	in
	p
ar
en
th
es
is
	(
R
ob
us
t	t
o	
he
te
ro
ce
da
st
ic
it
y)
.	S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e	
at
	1
	p
or
	1
00
	(
**
*)
,	5
	p
or
	1
00
	(
**
),
10
	p
or
	1
00
	(
*)
,	1
5	
po
r	
10
0	
(+
).
	
90	 CUADERNOS	ECONóMICOS	DE	ICE	N.O	88
results	for	the	variable	of	the	share	of	low-cost	airlines	are	mixed.	Its	coefficient	is	
negative	and	statistically	significant	in	the	regression	that	uses	ordinary	least	squares	
but	it	is	positive	and	not	statistically	significant	in	the	regression	that	uses	random	
and	fixed	effects.	Thus,	no	clear	conclusions	can	be	reached	regarding	this	variable.	
The	coefficient	of	the	dummy	variable	for	the	period	after	the	merger	is	negative	
in	all	 regressions	although	 it	 is	not	 statistically	significant	when	 the	estimation	 is	
made	using	the	ordinary	least	squares.	Note	that	the	economic	situation	was	worse	in	
the	period	after	the	merger	so	that	this	explains	the	negative	sign	of	this	coefficient.	
In	 this	 regard,	 the	 impact	of	 the	crisis	should	be	similar	 in	 routes	affected	by	 the	
merger	and	routes	not	affected	by	the	merger.	Hence,	my	test	about	the	impact	of	the	
merger	on	route	frequencies	should	not	be	conditioned	by	the	economic	situation	of	
the	country	after	the	merger.	The	effect	of	the	economic	crisis	only	could	play	a	role	
when	I	make	the	comparison	between	domestic	and	international	routes	as	long	as	
domestic	routes	could	be	more	negatively	affected	by	the	crisis	(see	below).
The	 coefficient	 of	 the	 dummy	 variable	 for	 routes	 affected	 by	 the	 merger	 is	
positive	in	all	regressions	although	it	is	not	statistically	significant	when	using	the	
fixed	effects	method.	This	result	is	similar	to	what	I	found	in	the	descriptive	statistics	
analysis	developed	above.	Indeed,	routes	affected	by	the	merger	seems	to	be	denser	
than	other	routes	even	when	controlling	for	other	control	factors	that	may	explain	
route	frequencies.	
The	main	 variable	 of	my	 analysis	 is	 the	 variable	 that	 identity	 the	 difference-
in-difference	estimation	which	is	the	result	of	the	interaction	between	the	dummy	
variable	for	the	period	after	the	merger	and	the	dummy	variable	for	routes	affected	
by	the	merger.	The	coefficient	associated	to	this	interaction	variable	is	negative	in	
all	regressions.	It	is	not	statistically	significant	when	using	the	ordinary	least	squares	
and	it	is	statistically	significant	at	the	1	per	cent	level	when	accounting	for	the	panel	
nature	of	my	date	(i.e.	regressions	with	random	and	fixed	effects).
Table	 	 shows	 the	 results	 of	 estimates	 of	 the	 frequency	 equation	 for	 different	
subsamples.	 Here	 I	 only	 report	 results	 for	 the	 difference-in-difference	 estimator	
as	 it	 is	 the	main	focus	of	 the	analysis.	First,	 I	consider	 routes	 that	 just	depart	 from	
Madrid	 or	 Barcelona	 airport	 (I	 do	 not	 have	 enough	 observations	 to	make	 specific	
regressions	 for	 routes	 departing	 just	 from	 Ibiza	 or	Valencia).	Then,	 I	 consider	 just	
domestic	 or	 international	 routes.	 The	 difference-in-difference	 estimator	 is	 negative	
in	all	regressions	for	all	subsamples.	In	the	case	of	routes	that	have	Madrid	airport,	
the	coefficient	is	statistically	significant	at	the	10	per	cent	level	in	all	regressions.	In	
routes	departing	 from	Barcelona	airport,	 the	coefficient	of	 the	variable	 is	generally	
statistically	significant	at	the	5	per	cent	or	1	per	cent	level.	Regarding	domestic	routes,	
the	 interaction	variable	 is	statistically	significant	 in	all	 regressions	at	 the	5	per	cent	
level.	When	I	focus	the	attention	on	international	routes,	the	difference-in-difference	
estimator	is	not	statistically	significant	when	I	use	the	ordinary	least	squares	and	it	is	
statistically	significant	at	the	1	per	cent	level	when	I	use	fixed	or	random	effects.	
Table	7	shows	the	elasticities	obtained	from	the	estimates	for	the	difference-in-
difference	 variable.	 The	 magnitude	 of	 the	 estimated	 elasticities	 moves	 generally	
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around	4	per	cent.	Taking	the	mean	values	for	the	whole	sample,	this	would	mean	that	
the	merger	has	implied	a	reduction	in	about	60	flights	per	year	(a	little	bit	more	than	
one	flight	per	week).	Overall,	my	regressions	show	a	clear	fall	in	route	frequencies	
although	the	magnitude	of	the	effect	is	relatively	modest.	
I	do	not	find	consistent	differences	in	the	impact	of	the	merger	on	frequencies	in	
routes	with	origin	either	in	Madrid	or	Barcelona	airport.	Otherwise,	the	impact	of	the	
merger	seems	to	be	stronger	for	domestic	than	for	national	routes	taking	into	account	
that	elasticities	obtained	with	the	fixed	effects	estimator	are	less	reliable	as	they	do	
not	capture	the	effect	of	time-invariant	variables.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 remark	 here	 that	 I	 find	 a	 negative	 impact	 of	 the	merger	 on	
frequencies	even	after	controlling	for	several	competition	indicators	and	other	route	
attributes.	Thus,	given	the	levels	of	competition,	the	merger	has	implied	a	reduction	
in	the	number	of	flights	offered	by	airlines	in	the	routes	affected	by	the	merger.	
Indeed,	the	drop	in	flight	frequencies	may	be	related	to	the	higher	concentration	
or	greater	share	of	the	merged	airline.	This	airline,	which	could	be	less	exposed	to	
flights	offered	by	its	rivals,	could	reduce	frequencies	to	save	fixed	costs	and	ensure	
higher	load	factors	for	its	planes.	This	drop	in	frequencies	could	also	be	associated	
with	an	increased	presence	of	low	cost	carriers	on	the	routes	affected	by	the	merger.	
However,	my	regressions	take	into	account	all	these	factors.	
It	could	also	be	argued	that	the	drop	in	frequency	is	due	to	the	fact	that,	in	the	post-
merger	period,	the	overall	economic	situation	of	Spain	was	worse.	However,	there	is	
nothing	to	lead	us	to	think	that	the	routes	affected	by	the	merger	have	suffered	most	
from	the	crisis	than	other	routes.
TABLE 7
ELASTICITIES FOR THE DIFF-In-DIFF VARIABLE EVALuATED AT SAMPLE 
MEAnS 
OLS Random effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
All	routes –0.43 –0.54 –0.47 –0.49 –0.44 –0.47
Routes	with	origin	in	Madrid	
airport	
(N=27)
–0.38 –0.3 –0.37 –0.41 –0.3 –0.40
Routes	with	origin	in	
Barcelona	airport
(N=280)
–0.3 –0.49 –0.38 –0.41 –0.38 –0.39
Domestic	routes
(N=20)
–0.39 –0.49 –0.39 –0.44 –0.31 –0.35
International	routes
(N=49)
–0.22 –0.39 –0.29 –0.35 –0.29 –0.34
NOTES:	Standard	errors	in	parenthesis	(Robust	to	heterocedasticity).	Significance	at	1	per	cent	(***),	5	per	cent	
(**),10	per	cent	(*),	15	per	cent	(+).	In	specification	(1)	competition	is	measured	through	HHI,	while	in	specification	
(2)	is	measured	through	the	variables	for	the	share	of	low–cost	airlines	and	share	of	the	merged	airline.
					AN	EMPIRICAL	ASSESSMENT	OF	THE	MERGER	BETWEEN	IBERIA,	CLICKAIR	AND	VUELING	 93
Hence,	the	most	plausible	explanation	of	my	results	is	a	more	collusive	behavior	
of	airlines	offering	flights	in	the	routes	affected	by	the	merger.	In	the	period	previous	
to	the	merger,	competition	between	Vueling	and	the	other	two	airlines	involved	in	
the	merger	was	very	 intense.	 In	 the	period	after	 the	merger,	competition	between	
Vueling	and	other	airlines	operating	in	the	route	seems	to	be	softer	(regardless	the	
levels	of	concentration	or	the	share	of	Vueling	in	the	route).
In	 this	regard,	a	more	collusive	behavior	could	also	explain	 that	 the	 impact	of	
the	merger	has	been	stronger	in	domestic	routes.	Rivals	of	Vueling	in	these	routes	
are	usually	Air	Europa	or	Spanair	while	airlines	 like	Ryanair,	Easyjet	are	usually	
operating	in	the	international	routes.	It	could	be	that	big	European	low-cost	airlines	
were	implementing	a	more	aggressive	behavior	in	international	routes	that	were	able	
to	do	airlines	with	the	bulk	of	their	traffic	in	the	Spanish	market.	
	However,	the	higher	reduction	in	frequencies	in	domestic	routes	could	also	be	
explained	by	a	stronger	impact	of	the	crisis	in	such	routes	as	Spain	in	years	2010	
and	2011	was	suffering	more	the	crisis	than	other	countries	of	the	European	Union	
that	concentrate	a	high	number	of	destinations	in	international	routes	departing	from	
Spanish	airports	like	Germany,	United	Kingdom,	France	or	Italy.	
Overall,	the	merger	may	have	had	a	negative	impact	on	passengers	in	terms	of	
lower	flight	frequencies.	It	seems	that	this	negative	impact	may	be	explained	by	a	
more	collusive	behavior	of	airlines	offering	flights	in	the	affected	routes.	However,	
the	magnitude	of	the	negative	impact	is	too	modest	to	put	into	question	the	decision	
of	the	European	Commission	to	approve	the	merger.	
Overall,	 competition	 authorities	 should	 not	 be	 particularly	 concerned	 by	 the	
dynamics	 of	 the	 Spanish	 airline	market	 as	 airport	 constraints	 are	 not	 currently	 a	
major	entry	barrier	and	airlines	like	Ryanair,	Easyjet,	Air	Berlin	or	Norwegian	have	
an	increasing	presence	in	this	market.	Iberia	has	a	large	share	of	flights	in	Madrid	
airport	but	 inter-hub	competition	and	 the	 increasing	presence	of	 low-cost	 airlines	
and	high-speed	 train	services	are	weakening	 its	dominant	position.	Vueling	has	a	
strong	position	 in	Barcelona	airport	but	Ryanair	 (and	other	 low-cost	 carriers)	 are	
fearsome	rivals	for	this	airline.	
Intense	 competition	 in	 the	 airline	 segment	 contrasts	 with	 the	 monopoly	 of	
AENA	 in	 the	management	 of	 airports	 with	 commercial	 traffic	 (Bel	 and	 Fageda,	
2011;	Comisión	Nacional	 de	 los	Mercados	 y	 la	Competencia,	 2014).	The	 partial	
privatization	of	 the	airport	operator	 running	can	aggravate	problems	 in	 the	 future	
in	terms	of	efficiency	and	incentives	arising	from	the	lack	of	competition	between	
airports	to	capture	traffic	of	airlines.	Hence,	competition	authorities	will	likely	have	
to	focus	on	the	airport	segment	of	the	market	in	the	coming	years.	
5. Concluding remarks
In	this	paper,	I	have	show	that	the	merger	between	Iberia,	Clickair	and	Vueling	
has	implied	a	reduction	in	the	total	number	of	flights	offered	in	routes	where	two	of	
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these	airlines	were	operating	simultaneously	before	the	merger	was	made	effective.	
However,	the	mean	estimated	impact	of	this	frequency	fall	is	just	about	a	little	bit	
more	than	one	flight	per	week.	Note	 that	 in	 the	routes	affected	by	 the	merger	 the	
increase	in	the	concentration	index	has	been	small	and	there	has	been	an	increase	in	
the	share	of	low-cost	airlines.	In	this	regard,	it	is	also	remarkable	the	decrease	in	the	
share	of	the	merged	airline.	Overall,	it	does	not	seem	that	the	merged	airline	is	able	
to	exploit	unilaterally	its	market	power	after	the	merger	was	made	effective.	At	least,	
this	is	not	a	robust	explanation	for	the	results	of	my	analysis.	
What	 it	 seems	 is	 that	 the	 behavior	 of	 airlines	 operating	 in	 the	 routes	 affected	
by	 the	merger	 is	 less	competitive	after	 than	before	 the	merger.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	
intense	rivalry	between	Vueling	and	Clickair	 in	 the	period	before	 the	merger	was	
not	financially	sustainable	in	the	longer	term	at	least	for	the	weaker	airline.	It	is	not	
surprising	to	find	some	evidence	of	a	more	collusive	behavior	in	the	period	after	the	
merger	because	a	war	price	was	in	place	in	the	period	before	the	merger.	Thus,	the	
decision	of	the	European	Commission	to	approve	the	merger	seems	to	be	justified.	
In	this	regard,	note	also	that	the	bankruptcy	of	Vueling	was	also	unavoidable	in	the	
context	of	the	aggressive	behavior	of	its	rival.	
This	being	said,	the	ex-post	actions	of	competition	authorities	(in	the	case	of	the	
airline	sector	the	European	Commission)	should	be	complemented	by	ex-ante	actions	
of	national	authorities.	The	transfer	of	slots	of	Iberia	to	Clickair	was	doubtful	from	
a	legal	point	of	view	and	it	could	be	the	case	that	these	two	airlines	were	following	
a	predatory	behavior	before	Vueling	was	forced	to	merge	with	them.	In	any	case,	
the	increased	presence	of	low-cost	airlines	in	a	market	where	capacity	constraints	
at	the	largest	airports	are	less	severe	that	use	to	be,	seems	to	guarantee	a	reasonable	
intensity	in	the	levels	of	competition	in	the	coming	years.	
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